It was not until 1958 that Soviet historians recognized Churchill`s account in triumph and tragedy and denied it only to deny it.  Soviet diplomat Igor Zemskov wrote in the historical journal Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn that Churchill`s assertion of a percentage agreement was a baseless “sordid and rude” lie and said that Stalin had not made such an offer that it would have refused if it had been made.  The accusation that Stalin coldly and cynically abandoned the EAM, which was able to retake all of Greece in October 1944, proved damaging to his reputation in left-wing circles. Some historians, including Gabriel Kolko and Geoffrey Roberts, believe that the importance of the agreement is overstated.  Kolko writes: On May 4, 1944, Churchill asked his Foreign Minister Anthony Eden the rhetorical question: “Will we accept the communitarianization of the Balkans and perhaps Italy?”  Churchill answered his own question by saying that Britain must “resist communist infusion and invasion.”  The attempt to gain spheres of influence for the Balkans has led Gusev to question whether the Americans would be involved.  Eden assured Gusev that the Americans would support the spheres of influence of the agreement, but on request, the State Department responded firmly that it was not the policy of the United States to conclude such agreements as would violate the Atlantic Charter.  Churchill found himself in a difficult situation and spoke directly to Roosevelt. The British historian David Carlton recounts that, as Churchill saw, the agreement was very favourable to Great Britain, since the eAM controlled mainly Greece, which Stalin accepted as an area of British influence, while Britain, in turn, recognized Bulgaria and Romania, which already occupied the Red Army, as in the Soviet sphere of influence.  From a British perspective, Greece, in the British sphere of influence, put an end to any possibility that the EAM could take power and then give the Soviet Union bases in Greece, whose situation made that nation the key to control of the eastern Mediterranean, which was far more important to Churchill than the rest of the Balkans.
 The fact that Roosevelt did not share Churchill`s enthusiasm for the restoration of King George II as King of Greece was a decisive factor in securing his own agreement with Stalin on Greece and excluding the Americans.  Churchill feared that if Roosevelt was involved in discussions about the future of Greece, the Americans might side with the Soviets and agree to recognize the EAM as a legitimate government of Greece.  During the dekemvriana fighting in Athens, Roosevelt made a statement rejecting the British eAM fighters, and privately stated that he was appalled by the way the British openly recruited the collaborative security battalions that had loyally served Nazi Germany to fight with them the EAM.  Similarly, American media coverage of the Dekemvriana was largely hostile to the British, with American journalists criticizing Churchill for recruiting security battalions to fight for the unpopular King George.  Churchill`s copy of his secret agreement with Stalin.  At the same time as the Red Army was advancing in the Balkans and fighting in Hungary, Western allies were stranded on the Western Front when the hopes of the Anglo-American generals to wage war until Christmas were dashed by the violent resistance of the Wehrmacht.  The widespread conviction of Anglo-American officers that the Normandy campaign paralyzed the Wehrmacht in Western Europe proved to be false, for in what German historians call the “September miracle”, the Wehrmacht was recovering from its defeat in Normandy and halted the Allied advance.  To maintain their progress, the Allies needed a large port closer to their lines than Cherbourg and Marseille.  As the Allies advanced towards Europe, their power lines ran thinner, while German power lines were shortened, giving the Wehrmacht the advantage in the fighting.  By the Wehrmacht, which, after 1940, had neglected the western wall along the border with France